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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the role of tax havens and offshore financial centers (THOFC) in the 
global economy. Network analysis of 24 industry sectors suggests that THOFC feature 
prominently in knowledge-intensive activities such as Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology, and 
Semiconductors, and are least significant in industrial activities such as Automobiles and 
Consumer Durables, and place-bound activities such as Real Estate and Retailing. Contrasting 
with the notion that most THOFC are ‘rogue’ offshore territories, the most significant are either 
continental nation-states or British territorial dependencies. We conclude that global firm 
networks often mimic the geographies of taxation more than actual production or consumption 
activities. 
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Introduction 
The role of tax havens and offshore financial centers (THOFC) in the global economy is an 
increasingly salient research topic, particularly since the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 
(Aalbers, 2018; Buckley, 2015; Cantwell, 2014; Haberly and Wójcik, 2014b; Jones et al., 2018; 
Wójcik, 2013b; Zucman, 2015). As the recent ‘Panama Papers’ and ‘Luxleaks’ scandals have 
revealed, firms seek to minimize their tax liabilities through opaque financial instruments that 
deliberately obfuscate transactional details, while individuals do so through ‘offshore’ trusts 
and the like. Though the magnitude of THOFC activity is difficult to gauge due to its oft-
secretive nature, various studies estimate that: such jurisdictions mediate 30% of global foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Haberly and Wójcik, 2015a); global revenue losses from corporate 
tax avoidance total approximately US$500 billion annually (Cobham and Janský, 2018); and, 
40% of multi-national corporate profits are shifted to THOFC each year (Tørsløv et al., 2018). 
THOFC also play a fundamental role in private wealth accumulation and management, 
harboring $12 trillion of the wealth of the global rich (Palan et al., 2010), or 8% of the world’s 
total household financial wealth (Alstadsæter, 2018). 
Despite the apparent importance of THOFC in the global economy, there remains a 
paucity of insight into the role of specific jurisdictions in mediating offshore capital flows, and 
the relational role they play in industry group networks. This paper contributes to the growing 
body of literature on THOFC by investigating how various ‘offshore’ jurisdictions are 
distinguished across globalized industry networks, and how networked firms embed THOFC 
broadly within their global corporate structures. To this end, it draws together the strategic 
management (SM) and economic geography (EG) literatures to elucidate the functional and 
sectoral specialization of THOFC. Although both SM and EG scholars have recently shifted 
attention to THOFC (Demere et al., 2017; Janský and Prats, 2015; Haberly and Wójcik, 2015a, 
2015b), there remains little cross-dialogue, and virtually no literature on THOFC that integrates 
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the firm-based approach of the former with the systems perspective of the latter. We argue that 
such a dialogue is critical in better understanding firm dynamics, e.g. their locational choices 
and internationalization strategies. The integration of THOFC into firm networks has 
reoriented the role of ‘place’ in firm decision-making from one based on either supply-side or 
demand-side advantages, to one tied to purely financial considerations derived from complex 
regulatory arbitrage.  
In what follows, this paper applies network theory to empirically support the notion that 
THOFC are fundamental building blocks of the global economic system. We first focus on the 
specialization of THOFC as embedded nodes within global firm networks, before shifting 
attention to differences between industry groups. The geo-economic configurations revealed in 
the network topologies demonstrate that corporate network structures often replicate the 
geographies of taxation rather than actual firm activities. 
 
THOFC in a Rapidly Changing Global Political Economy 
The surging interest in THOFC by both scholars and policymakers in the recent past has been 
driven by changing conditions in the global political economy. FDI flows have increased 
markedly since the 1960s and accelerated rapidly since the 1990s, reaching a high of $1.8 
trillion in 2016 (UNCTAD, 2018). Much of this is tied to the geographic expansion of multi-
national corporations (MNCs) beyond the Global North, with FDI to developing countries now 
comprising nearly half of global flows. Furthermore, unlike their domestically oriented 
predecessors, MNCs of the 21st century are often highly footloose, with labor, resources and 
capital inputs sourced internationally according to firm and industry requirements (Hampton 
and Levi, 1999; Doh, 2005). For example, the world’s five largest corporations (by current 
market capitalization) are in the information technology (IT) sector (in contrast to past industry 
giants in manufacturing, bricks-and-mortar retail, or energy) with key assets lying in 
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intellectual property, brand, and data —assets that are often intangible, and can be transported 
across borders with ease. As Pellicelli (2018) argues, major changes in the global economy 
have led to corporate innovation and flexibility through agile organizational structures such as 
the ‘virtual’ firm.  
Given the large-scale movement toward offshoring or outsourcing of production, 
THOFC have increasingly been critical to anointing complex geo-economic structures. This is 
largely the result of the increasing ‘financialization’ of global production, linking global capital 
markets to daily staples such as commodities, housing, and utilities. The implication of these 
changes has been the rapid expansion of capital markets, with emerging financial technologies 
and platforms driving much of the growth. By corollary, this has led to the emergence of global 
financial centers as major services hubs (Wójcik et al., 2018), which include both ‘onshore’ 
world cities such as New York, Tokyo, and London as well as the lesser-known ‘offshore’ 
locations—the focus of this paper. More specifically, we focus on the role of THOFC within 
MNE networks so as to better understand how financialization has redirected global economic 
networks from a focus on ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ economies providing access to capital and 
innovation, and resources and labor, respectively, toward a more complex picture whose 
geographical contours are best explained by territorial taxation and regulation regimes.  
Furthermore, ‘innovations’ in financial instrumentation have estranged financial 
markets from production, with derivatives such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO), credit default swaps (CDS) and the like being strongly 
linked to the banking turmoil that caused the GFC (Aalbers, 2018; Brunnermeier, 2009; Crotty, 
2009). This becomes even more salient as cryptocurrencies are untethered from jurisdictions, 
and as the line between multinational and domestic firms becomes increasingly blurred by large 
border-free trading blocs (e.g. the European Union), and by the digital nature of quotidian 
financial transactions.  
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Firm Strategic Organization in THOFC 
Analyzing the role of THOFC in global corporate networks requires an understanding 
why firms locate where they do, and how this choice has both shaped and been shaped by 
regional alliances and networks (Barney, 1991; Gulati, 1998). Whilst this is a rising subject 
within the EG and SM literatures, there has been limited cross-dialogue despite their 
increasingly spatial thinking of the relationship between firm-level decisions and corporate 
geographies (Cantwell, 2014; Jones, 2018; Mudambi et al., 2018). Similar intersections have 
been explored in other ideologically similar theories, such as world city networks (WCN) and 
global production networks (GPN), in which collaborative projects examined the relationship 
between actor decision-making in production and global economic connections (Coe et al., 
2010; Taylor et al, 2014). As such, this special issue of Regional Studies exploring SM and EG 
intersections as a framework of analysis is both timely and relevant.  
SM builds on theories from economics and business studies (marketing and finance) 
related to a firm strategic locational decisions and clusters (cf. Porter, 1991), as well as 
sociology and psychology. It is concerned with overall firm performance, examining how 
internal firm operations are positioned and managed to optimize opportunities external to the 
firm (Nag et al., 2007). This includes literature on decision-making regarding strategic location 
of offices (Birkinshaw et al., 2006) and the boundary-spanning nature of global enterprises 
(Schotter et al., 2017). In research specifically on THOFC and firm decisions to locate within 
them, SM has largely focused on determinants such as tax minimization and avoidance 
strategies (Demere et al., 2017), firm maturity and level of operations (Hasan et al., 2017), as 
well as corporate managerial behaviors (Christensen et al., 2015). The relevance of geography 
to SM research on THOFC is pronounced, with research questions increasingly overlapping 
and indistinctive from those in the newish field of financial geography (FG)—a sub-field of 
economic geography focused on the global contours of money and finance. 
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Indeed, EG’s foray into the area of THOFC has largely centered on the nuanced 
geographies of taxation, regulation, and governance (Aalbers, 2018; Wójcik, 2013), with some 
more novel interpretations such as in the geographies of secrecy (Cobham et al., 2015). Much 
of this work draws upon branches of mainstream economics such as organizational studies and 
internalization theory (Buckley et al., 2015; Knight and Wójcik, 2017), employing data sets on 
producer services (Wójcik, 2013b) or foreign direct investment (Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017; 
Haberly and Wójcik, 2015a, 2015b; Ledyaeva et al., 2015). Nonetheless, EG has produced 
clear evidence of the strong geographic or regional component to global financial flows; for 
example, national preferences for particular OFCs from Russia (Ledyaeva et al., 2015) and 
China (Buckley et al., 2015).  
The intersection of SM and EG toward understanding THOFC activities and processes 
can be examined through two interrelated questions. First is how THOFC redistribute or 
reorient international capital flows. Here, firm decision-making is influenced by considerations 
that are fundamentally geographic in nature, such as where to locate global operations, and 
which national attributes form an attractive value proposition. Janský and Prats (2015) argue 
that corporation connections within THOFC lead to profit-sharing activities which reduce tax 
revenues of home governments, undermining policies targeting poverty and development. 
Jones and Temouri (2016) find that the variety of capitalism of a MNC home location, and the 
level of firms’ technological intensity, have a strong impact on their decision to take capital 
offshore, while their home country corporate tax rate has minimal impact. Furthermore, 
Tørsløv et al. (2018) note that foreign firms are inherently more profitable than domestic firms 
as they move profits across borders to take advantage of lower tax rates elsewhere. This implies 
that MNCs are more competitive than their domestic counterparts, weakening efforts to 
promote and support national economies. However, as Desai et al. (2006) contend, the reduced 
costs of using THOFC may actually stimulate investment in high-tax countries. 
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Second is the question of how corporate strategic decision-making and financial flows 
relate to ‘place’ as regions and countries specialize through legal or institutional arrangements. 
Corporate strategies consider differential tax rates with regard to enhancing profitability 
(Glaister and Hughes, 2008), with Behrendt and Wamser (2018) observing how institutional 
arrangements between countries (e.g. bilateral taxation treaties) influence corporate locational 
decisions. Likewise, public scrutiny affects firm tax avoidance behavior as consumer reputation 
and/or reduced political efficacy can negatively impact profit (Dyreng et al., 2016).  
The relatively recent systematic integration of THOFC into global economic networks 
provides additional motivation for integrating SM and EG theories and approaches. While 
several staple theories of SM and international business (IB) such as the resource-based view 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), and Dunning’s (1977) Ownership Location Internationalization (OLI), 
treat space and place as strategic assets (cf. Jones, 2018), or as part of a strategy to access 
factors of production or new markets, the integration of THOFC into firm networks suggests 
that new geographical considerations are at work. Financialization of the firm, and the economy 
more broadly, has meant that MNCs have shifted their locational considerations toward those 
that optimize balance sheets. This reorients firm networks to mirror the geographies of taxation, 
the global distribution of which is remarkably different than the geographies of production and 
consumption.  
 
Tax Havens and Offshore Financial Centers 
As Seabrooke and Wigan (2017) observe, ‘there is a general silence about the ‘offshore 
world’ in economics, which stays firmly within the boundaries of established national and 
international law rather than the gray zones in-between’ (p. 4). Despite their outsized influence 
in global economic transactions (Hudson, 2000), there is limited scholarship on how firms 
incorporate THOFC within their spatial organizational strategies, or about the economic 
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ecosystems of THOFC. Many are in fact small jurisdictions that would otherwise struggle to 
attract FDI and other forms of capital investment (Cobb, 1998) 
The identification of THOFC presents a challenge in and of itself. Neither ‘tax haven’ 
nor ‘offshore financial center’ is an adequate term to reflect the true nature of such jurisdictions. 
Despite the perception that THOFC are associated with illicit activity, or remote islands with 
questionable legal and/or regulatory frameworks, research has demonstrated their ubiquity in 
global financial networks across every sector (García-Bernardo et al., 2017) and that good 
governance and strong institutions are a key attribute (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009). For firms 
and individuals from many nations in the global South, financial institutions in tax havens may 
in fact offer significantly greater regulation and/or stability.  
THOFC are jurisdictions that offer non-resident individuals or corporations advantages 
unavailable in their home jurisdiction. These include low or no taxation of profits, income or 
other earnings such as dividends; secrecy; greater capacity to raise capital or bear debt; and, 
minimal financial regulation (Hampton and Christensen, 2002). Each firm has unique reasons 
for pursuing THOFC activity, with literature suggesting the strong role of: path dependence 
and geography (Buckley et al., 2015; Haberly and Wójcik, 2015a); levels of technological 
intensity (Jones and Temouri, 2016); legal systems (Dharmapala and Hines, 2006; Mudambi 
et al., 2018); varieties of capitalism (Jones and Temouri, 2016); and, favorable tax conditions 
(Rose and Spiegel, 2007; Weyzig, 2013).  
Given the enhanced role of THOFC in global financial circuits, a number of 
organizations now catalogue and monitor their activity, including to varying degrees multi-
national organizations such as the OECD, G-20, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
such as the Tax Justice Network and Oxfam, in addition to academic research (cf. Zucman, 
2015). Palan et al. (2010), for example, provide a typology of corporate tax havens that includes 
incorporation centers with low regulation or tax rates; registration centers (e.g. British Virgin 
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Islands (BVI), Panama); secrecy locations (e.g. Liechtenstein); specialist service providers 
(e.g. Bermuda, Isle of Man); and market-entry conduits (notably, The Netherlands). García-
Bernardo et al. (2017) identify ‘conduits’ and ‘sinks’ as THOFC that act as intermediaries and 
repositories of corporate financial flows, respectively. Conduits are mainly ‘onshore’ tax 
havens used to divert profits (and liabilities) such as The Netherlands, Ireland, and Switzerland, 
and exploit loopholes such as the infamous ‘Double Irish Dutch Sandwich’ (Loomis, 2011). 
While sinks are more traditional tax havens used to shelter capital wealth. Hampton and 
Christensen (2002) divide THOFC into two fundamental categories, including functional and 
notional. The former being where banks locate (e.g. Bermuda, Channel Islands) and the latter 
where they register (e.g. Seychelles, Labuan), with another category comprising hybrids (e.g. 
Cayman Islands).  
Other factors further complicate the identification of THOFC. Many are large territorial 
states with economies seated in non-financial activities, such as Singapore and The 
Netherlands. The United States (US), for example, is widely cited as one of the world’s most 
significant THOFC as it does not generally share financial information on assets and income 
beyond its own borders. There are also cases where sub-national jurisdictions fit the criteria of 
THOFC, offering either low or no tax on economic activities, or unique corporate structures. 
Labuan is a Malaysian Federal Territory offering tax benefits through its International Business 
and Financial Center (IBFC), while a handful of US states such as Delaware and Wyoming 
offer ‘anonymous’ limited liability corporations (LLCs) and related benefits. Some may argue 
that the world’s many special economic zones (SEZs) are a form of tax haven in that they 
facilitate transfer pricing. Also, some of the most well-known tax havens are not fully 
sovereign, including: crown dependencies (Isle of Man, Channel Islands); unincorporated 
territories (Puerto Rico); overseas territories (BVI, Bermuda, Cayman Islands); constituent 
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countries (Aruba, Curaçao); and, free associations (Marshall Islands, Niue). Varying degrees 
of autonomy of these locations effects levels of reporting, compliance and data availability.  
The emergence of THOFC has been a gradual process reflecting the transformation of 
firms into ‘lean profit centers increasingly oriented towards the collection of rents from 
intangible assets’ (Haberly and Wójcik, 2015b, p. 76). Increasing sophistication of firm 
processes is anointed by specialized law firms and the ‘Big Four’ consultancies in particular 
(Jones et al., 2018). A common practice is for firms to establish special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs) or special purpose entities (SPEs) in THOFC, which facilitate both tax efficiency 
through profit shifting and transfer pricing (Alstadsæter et al., 2018), and tax advantaged 
transactions such as a higher level of tax-deductible debts, depreciation and losses, and external 
finance for research and development (R&D) activities (Demere et al., 2017).  
THOFC also offer ‘secrecy arbitrage’, which Ledyaeva et al. define as ‘the interplay of 
onshore corruption and offshore secrecy’ (2015, p. 332). A distinct yet related practice is 
known as ‘round-tripping’, which enhances a firm’s bargaining power by routing capital 
overseas and back again as ‘foreign’ investment. Numerous studies have documented round-
tripping to and from China (García-Herrero et al., 2015; Xiao, 2004), although both Buckley 
et al. (2015) and Jones and Temouri (2016) contend that the practice cannot be explained by 
tax-related issues alone. Thus there is no ‘standard’ practice amongst firms and related THOFC, 
and only through triangulating new perspectives and methods can the underlying processes in 
which they function be thoroughly understood. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Understanding the functional and sectoral specialization of THOFC vis-à-vis the networked 
structure of contemporary MNCs requires a global, systems-based approach. Network analysis 
provides one such perspective, facilitating the analysis of how THOFC are structurally 
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embedded in global financial circuits at the individual node (country) and system (industry 
group) level. Such a network approach is inspired by the recent ‘relational turn’ in urban and 
regional studies (e.g. Capello, 2000; Khanna, 2016), emphasizing that understandings of place 
should also be centered on how networks connect flows of people, knowledge, and capital. The 
applicability of network analysis is derived from its analytical features, as it is the interaction 
and exchange with other locations that allows THOFC to exert leverage in the global economic 
and financial system. Thus, rather than viewing THOFC as isolated clusters of capabilities and 
resources, a network perspective allows for their conceptualization as nodes in networks of 
capabilities and resources.  
 To empirically foreground this idea of THOFC as globally connected nodes, we draw 
upon firm headquarters and subsidiary data collected from 12 of the world’s most significant 
stock exchanges, including a total of 652,246 firm subsidiaries of 25,143 firms. These are taken 
from a geographically representative sample of all firms on the Australian Securities Exchange 
(Sydney), Bombay Stock Exchange (Mumbai), Bovespa (São Paulo), Deutsche Börse 
(Frankfurt), Euronext (multiple locations in Europe), London Stock Exchange, Nasdaq (New 
York), New York Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and 
the Toronto Stock Exchange. The number of subsidiaries associated with listed firms ranges 
from 178,544 of NYSE-listed firms to 3961 of Euronext-listed firms, with at least one exchange 
in each major world region. Several stock exchanges located within THOFC were not included 
despite their large size (e.g. those in Hong Kong, Singapore, Zurich), as they would have 
conflated non-THOFC activities (e.g. local company listings) with MNCs whose local registry 
was motivated primarily by tax purposes.  
Data preparation reduced the list of firms to those that were actively traded and had an 
identifiable country of registration between mid-2016 and mid-2017, when the sample was 
collected. Industry groups were derived from the Global Industry Classification System 
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(GICS), a standardized taxonomy that allows for harmonization across exchanges. The analysis 
was conducted using four-digit GICS code—a resolution that lies between 2-digit Sectors, and 
6-digit Industries. Subsidiary data were extracted from Osiris, a commercial corporate data 
repository provided by Bureau van Dijk, and supplemented by data from Bloomberg, 
Morningstar, Yahoo!, and from the exchanges themselves. Firm headquarters locations were 
matched to subsidiary locations using firms’ International Securities Identification Number 
(ISIN)—a unique company identifier where the first two digits indicate country of registration. 
Thus, despite the complex organizational structure of firms, each headquarters or subsidiary 
location was attributed to a single jurisdiction. Countries were enumerated by ISO-2 code, so 
both sovereign nation-states and territorial dependencies were recorded, including the Chinese 
Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of Hong Kong and Macao. This study examines first-
order relations between firms at headquarters and subsidiary locations, though it is likely that 
many corporate structures are routed through multiple jurisdictions that obfuscate ownership 
through arms-length corporations. This includes the likes of SPEs and SPVs that are custom-
created with firm-specific needs in mind.  
For this study, THOFCs were identified a priori, in contrast to other studies where they 
emerged from the data based on FDI and other proxy indicators (cf. García-Bernardo et al., 
2017; Zoromé, 2007). 49 jurisdictions were identified using two indicators—one based on the 
OECD and other from the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP), a Washington-
based non-partisan think-tank. These jurisdictions include a diversity of countries, divided 
roughly in half between fully sovereign states and territorial dependencies. 41 of the identified 
jurisdictions had at least one headquarters or subsidiary office location. Table 1 below lists the 
top 20 headquarters and subsidiary locations identified as THOFC.  
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<Insert Table One Approximately Here> 
 
There are considerably more THOFC in subsidiary than headquarters locations, even when the 
relatively larger absolute number of subsidiaries is taken into consideration. The distribution 
of headquarters locations skews strongly toward a select few ‘sink’ jurisdictions. This includes 
the British dependencies of the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Channel Islands (Jersey and 
Guernsey), and BVI, in addition to European ‘conduits’ such as The Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Ireland. Subsidiaries, on the other hand, are more broadly distributed and include many of 
the same countries as well as Singapore, Switzerland, and Malaysia. While a relatively small 
proportion of headquarters are located in THOFC (3%), 7.4% of subsidiary locations are in 
THOFC, ranging from Real Estate (3%) to Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 
(14%). Knowledge-intensive industry groups display the highest level of THOFC activity, 
including Pharmaceuticals (12%), Biotechnology & Life Sciences, Software & Services (10%), 
and Technology Hardware & Equipment (11%). Conversely, highly localized industry groups 
such as Consumer Durables & Apparel (6%), Food & Staples Retailing (7%), Retailing (4%), 
and Utilities (5%) are less likely to have subsidiaries in THOFC.  
Our primary interest is in inter-country connections, and as such our use of network 
analysis is conceptually similar to that of ‘world city network’ (WCN) analysis where corporate 
locations are a proxy for how strongly places are interconnected. This literature draws on a 
two-mode corporate location matrix (firm by city) to model a one-mode inter-city network 
where the links between cities (nodes) are formed by the relations between firms’ offices 
locations (edges) (Derudder and Taylor, 2018). This entails the projection of a two-mode 
matrix (firm by city) into a one-mode matrix (city by city), with this bipartite projection 
function making clearly defined assumptions about how the ‘co-behavior’ of agents (the 
ensemble of a firm’s offices) leads to networking (interaction between these offices; Neal, 
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2014a). A long-standing critique of WCN literature is that these assumptions are only loosely 
based on theoretical understandings of firm behavior (cf. Nordlund, 2004; Neal 2014b). 
Nonetheless, these assumptions on firms’ ‘co-behavior’ can be tangibly linked to the location 
of firms – forming inter-relationships between places – so that the different interactions in 
corporate structures can be condensed into a coherent conception of networking. 
Here, we apply one of the most widely adopted bipartite projection functions in WCN 
research on corporate networks: that of Alderson and Beckfield (2004), Wall and van der 
Knaap (2011) and, Martinus and Sigler (2018); where it is assumed that a firm-subsidiary 
relationship between two locations 𝑖 and 𝑗 represents a connection between those locations. 
The interaction represents an asymmetric corporate flow of information, knowledge, and 
direction between locations. Each of the 24 firm-by-country contingency tables are thus treated 
as a series of two-mode networks (firm-by-country), converted into one-mode (country-by-
country) networks by industry group based on headquarters-subsidiary location relationships 
in corporate structures. The mathematical specification is a directed weighted network 
𝐺[𝛼](𝒱, ℰ[𝛼])  constructed for each industrial sector 𝛼 , where each of the 𝑁 = |𝒱|  nodes 
represents a country. Relationships between countries within a given sector 𝛼 are encoded in 
the set of links ℰ[𝛼]. These 24 networks are fully described by the non-negative adjacency 
matrices 𝑊[𝛼] ≡ {𝑤𝑖𝑗[𝛼]}, one for each sector. An element 𝑤𝑖𝑗[𝛼] of 𝑊[𝛼] is different from zero if 
a parent-subsidiary relationship exists between the two countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 in the sector 𝛼, with 
the value quantifying the strength of the relationship. Weights are assigned by counting the 
number of subsidiaries located in a country that share a parent company in the other. More 
precisely, a weight 𝑤𝑖𝑗[𝛼]  associated to a directed link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ ℰ  denotes the number of 
subsidiaries in country 𝑗 that refer to parent companies located in country 𝑖, all belonging to 
the industrial sector 𝛼.  Since only intercountry relationships were considered ( 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) , the 
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information regarding subsidiaries operating in the same country as their parents are not 
retained. This produced networks without self-loops.  
The network representation allows for a comprehensive study of the role of a country 
within a specific sector vis-à-vis the different centrality measures (Latora et al., 2017). Each 
reflects a different yet complementary element of ‘importance’ of a node (i.e. THOFC) in a 
network (i.e. corporate networks). The most basic and straightforward centrality measures are 
the in-strength and out-strength, which account for the total strength of the incoming and 
outgoing connections for a given node within a sector. As the weighted extension of degree 
(the number of connections of a node), the in-strength 𝑠𝑖𝑛[𝛼](𝑖) of a country 𝑖 ∈ 𝒱 for a sector 𝛼 
is defined as the sum of the weights of its incoming links. This can be computed from 𝑊[𝛼] as: 
 
 𝑠𝑖𝑛[𝛼](𝑖) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑖[𝛼]𝑁𝑗=1       (1) 
 
Similarly, the out-strength can be written as the sum of the weights of the outgoing links, or: 
 
𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡[𝛼] (𝑖) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗[𝛼]𝑁𝑗=1       (2) 
 
These two simple measures provide a useful description of the local properties of the networks 
at the level of nodes by focusing on first neighbors. Our second measure, eigenvector centrality 
(EC), looks at the global properties of the network by going beyond first neighbors. This takes 
into account the secondary effect of being connected to a node that is itself well connected. It 
can be considered as a generalization of degree centrality. The EC of a country 𝑖 ∈ 𝒱 for a 
sector 𝛼 is given by: 
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  𝐸𝐶[𝛼](𝑖) = 𝑢1,𝑖[𝛼]       (3) 
 
with 𝑢1,𝑖 representing the i-th component 𝒖1[𝛼], the eigenvector associated to the eigenvalue 
𝜆1[𝛼] of 𝐴[𝛼], such that it satisfies: 
 
   𝐴[𝛼]𝒖1[𝛼] = 𝜆1[𝛼]𝒖1[𝛼]      (4) 
 
In this case, 𝐴[𝛼] ≡ {𝑎𝑖𝑗[𝛼]} is the adjacency matrix of 𝐺[𝛼], whose non-zero elements denote the 
presence of a link between country 𝑖 and country 𝑗 without a specified direction. The sectorial 
networks were visualized by using the layout produced by the Yifan Hu algorithm (Hu, 2005), 
while the size of the nodes is given by the respective betweenness centrality. Given the density 
of the networks, a disparity filter (Serrano et al., 2009) was applied before the visualization in 
order to retain only the statistically significant links (p-value=0.05). 
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Analysis of THOFC within Global Economic Networks 
A number of well-known THOFC emerge as well-connected when contextualized within the 
global data set. As indicated by Table 2, out-strength (OS) and in-strength (IS) provide an 
overall impression of connectivity to headquarters and from subsidiaries in THOFC. OS 
measures how much a country i is used as a subsidiary location by firms located in other 
countries, while IS can be interpreted as how much firms across the entire world (within the 
respective industry group network) rely on country j as a headquarters location.  
 
<Insert Table Two Approximately Here> 
 
OS for subsidiary locations reveals that continental ‘conduits’, including Switzerland, The 
Netherlands, and Ireland, emerge as significant alongside ‘sinks’ such as Jersey and Bermuda. 
The top four countries comprise more than two-thirds of total OS, indicating a preference for 
particular reporting structures consisting of subsidiaries in Switzerland, The Netherlands, 
Jersey, and Ireland, which themselves may be parent companies (e.g. subsidiaries of 
subsidiaries). IS reveals a broader range of THOFC headquarters relations and includes both 
conduits, such as The Netherlands, Singapore, Ireland and Switzerland, and sinks such as the 
Cayman Islands and BVI. The latter two sinks are particularly relevant for Chinese firms, with 
Hong Kong listed as the third most significant subsidiary location. This range suggests a broad 
diversity of firm structures are used by headquarters, which often serve as holding corporations 
for a range of subsidiaries. The relatively small number of headquarters in Cyprus, for example, 
has hundreds of subsidiaries mainly in mining and real estate with ties to Russia, Israel and 
several African countries. The Marshall Islands’ 53 headquarters are linked to 947 subsidiaries 
almost exclusively through shipping companies, and related offshore oil & gas interests, tied 
to its historic ‘flag of convenience’ status.  
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Though geographical proximity does not fully explain THOFC relations, there is a 
strong level of regionalization with the data. This reflects both physical proximity, as well as 
socio-political ties as identified by Haberly and Wójcik (2015a). Australian subsidiaries’ 
primary ties are to Luxembourg and Singapore, both attributable to Australia’s strong industrial 
orientation toward mining and energy, respectively. Likewise, Australian firms’ subsidiary 
locations in Jersey, The Netherlands, Ireland and Bermuda indicate a combination of tax-
friendly holding corporations and strategic market entry points. Headquarters locations in 
France and Germany are strongly tied to European THOFC, including The Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and Belgium. German firms show a relatively stronger affiliation with 
Luxembourg-based subsidiaries. Offshore sinks are relatively uncommon in German and 
French corporate networks, with the exception of German corporations having subsidiaries in 
the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Regionalization is especially relevant amongst Asia-based 
firms, with Japan’s headquarters most connected to Singapore and Hong Kong. The 
Netherlands and Switzerland also feature prominently in Japanese firm networks, as do the 
Cayman Islands, Ireland, Panama, and BVI as subsidiary locations. China-based firms are by 
far most heavily tied to Hong Kong subsidiaries. This reflects the well-known structures 
documented within the literature (Buckley et al., 2015) through ties to BVI, Singapore and 
Cayman Islands subsidiaries. Hong Kong’s conduit role for China is to some degree analogous 
to the role of Singapore and Mauritius for India-based firms, and of Cyprus for Russian 
corporations. 
 Furthermore, contrary to the perception that THOFC are somehow peripheral to the 
‘mainstream’ global economy, the data indicate most relations involve the world’s major 
industrial economies. Half of the top ten connections either to or from THOFC involve the 
United States, with subsidiary connections to The Netherlands, Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, 
Hong Kong, Bermuda, Belgium, BVI, and Mauritius, while Switzerland is the most significant 
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headquarters location for US-based subsidiaries. The UK’s ties to The Netherlands and from 
Jersey also demonstrated The Netherlands’ conduit role, as well as Jersey’s special relationship 
to London and tendency toward Commonwealth locations with relatively stronger connectivity 
to the BVI.  
   
Industry Group Analysis of THOFC within Global Economic Networks 
Industry-specific trends reflect the varying financial-operational needs of firms within 
respective sectors. Knowledge-intensive industries such as Media (9.4%), Pharmaceuticals 
(7.9%), and various IT industry groups are the most connected to and from THOFC, suggesting 
firm strategies associated with high intellectual property and knowledge capital, and low 
physical requirements. Within those industries, almost all THOFC are ‘onshore’ conduits. Only 
Bermuda, BVI, Cayman Islands, and Jersey – all of which are British dependencies – are 
common in knowledge-intensive industry networks, indicating that most firms gravitate toward 
similar structures. Contrary to popular perception, the Financials sector (Banks, Diversified 
Financials) is not as well-networked through THOFC, potentially due to the use of 
affiliate/correspondent banks rather than subsidiaries. And the tendency for THOFC to be 
relatively absent in networks of industries with high requirements for access to final consumers 
and local inputs is demonstrated by the fact that the Real Estate (1.2%) had the lowest 
proportion of ties to and from THOFC, along with Utilities (1.7%), Food & Staples Retailing 
(2.1%), and Retailing (2.1%).  
 Figures 1-4 illustrate the network structure of four industry groups, with THOFC 
distinguished as orange circles, the size of which represent degree centrality. Two of these – 
Retailing and Utilities – indicate a weak role of THOFC through relatively few ties and low 
centrality. The other two – Technology Hardware & Equipment and Pharmaceuticals, 
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Biotechnology & Life Sciences – are illustrative of industry group networks in which THOFC 
are thoroughly embedded.  
The Retailing network (Figure 1) includes relatively few ‘offshore’ THOFC, with The 
Netherlands represented in six of the top ten dyadic relations. Retailing includes distribution, 
marketing, and various branches of both online and bricks-and-mortar, with a skew toward the 
latter as newer firms (e.g. online retailers) may list in the Consumer Discretionary or 
Information Technology sectors. Firm relations in Retailing include a number of producer 
nations, as well as overseas relations such as French subsidiaries of Mauritian firms or 
American subsidiaries of Singaporean ones. An analysis of centrality shows much the same, 
with The Netherlands as the most important node by EC, also indicating that Hong Kong, 
Belgium, Jersey and Mauritius are central to the network. Appendix 1 further illustrates these 
relationships. Some regionality is indicated by ties between China and Hong Kong; Japan and 
Singapore; and The Netherlands as a pan-European conduit. 
  
 <Insert Figure 1 approximately here> 
 
The Utilities network (Figure 2) provides another example of an industry group in 
which THOFC are relatively insignificant. The overall dominance of the US in Utilities is 
reflected by its strong ties to firms headquartered in The Netherlands, Bermuda, and Panama. 
Luxembourg features heavily in the networks of the European periphery (e.g. Romania, 
Bulgaria, Italy). In terms of centrality, the Cayman Islands and Singapore are the two most 
important nodes. The Netherlands, Bermuda, BVI and Luxembourg also play central roles. 
These relations are mainly formed by a relatively small number of firms. The network graph 
shows some degree of regionalization in Singapore’s connectivity to Malaysia and India; the 
infamous Dutch-Irish connection between the US, UK, and Germany, and France’s 
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connectivity to Belgium. THOFC in Utilities are primarily tied to corporate structures of 
renewable and alternative energy sources such as wind, solar, and biogas, indicating that state-
related ‘legacy’ companies would be far less likely to incorporate in THOFC than start-ups in 
which intellectual property and data, rather than physical infrastructures, are key assets.  
 
 <Insert Figure 2 approximately here> 
 
On the other hand, THOFC are well integrated into several networks, including the 
Technology Hardware & Equipment network (Figure 3). The overall network is dominated by 
Chinese firms, though the US and Japan are the best connected, with other technology leaders 
at the center of the network including France, Germany, South Africa, Finland, Canada, and 
Israel. Despite strong role of Chinese producers and consumers in the industry group, 
headquarters-subsidiary relations are mainly linked to the US in relations with The 
Netherlands, Malta, Bermuda, Belgium, and Singapore. EC shows a strong role for European 
conduits in the industry group network, with Singapore, Switzerland, Ireland, Hong Kong and 
The Netherlands as leading countries. The network structure includes the known Chinese firm 
sinks of the Cayman Islands and BVI, with Hong Kong as a regional conduit. 
  
<Insert Figure 3 approximately here> 
 
Likewise, the Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences network (Figure 4) has 
vast THOFC relations. The majority originate from US-based subsidiaries of firms in The 
Netherlands, Singapore, Belgium, and Bermuda. Apart from the Ireland-United Kingdom 
dyad, the top ten bilateral relations in Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences involve 
the US. Ireland and The Netherlands are the top two respective countries by EC, reflecting not 
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only their role in global pharmaceutical production and biotechnology research, but also the 
various tax structures they harbor. Despite having little to no local activity in the industry 
group, Jersey, Luxembourg, BVI and Bermuda all emerge as significant by EC, reflecting their 
role at the core of the industry group. As Figure 4 reveals, network ‘extremities’ such as Malta, 
Mauritius, Panama, and BVI serve as sinks for firms, and a closer look at these firms reveals 
that many of these are early-stage or small firms. Biotechnology hubs such as Switzerland and 
Singapore may also play a prominent role both as THOFC but also as sites of particular 
infrastructures or progressive legislation.  
  
  <Insert Figure 4 approximately here> 
 
Concluding Discussion 
THOFC serve a fundamental role in the global economic network. Their relative importance 
differs by industry and sector, but appears to be clearly linked to knowledge-intensive 
activities. In other words, financial transactions are offshored when intellectual property is high 
and physical capital is low. The networks of industry groups such as Pharmaceuticals, 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment, Software & Services, and Technology 
Hardware & Equipment embed THOFC extensively, whereas localized industries such as 
Retailing, Food & Staples Retailing, Utilities, and Real Estate do not to nearly the same extent. 
In the case of the former groups, both ‘profit shifting’ and ‘transfer pricing’ (Aalbers, 2018; 
Janský and Prats, 2015) explain firm behavior as international financial movements are easily 
justifiable in the case of knowledge capital in the form of data or patent royalties. The rare 
cases in which the latter are connected through THOFC headquarters or subsidiaries are often 
linked to new industries, such as digital retail, newer energy sources and/or technologies (e.g. 
23 
 
wind, photovoltaic), or property investment SPVs more so than ‘traditional’ retail or industrial-
era firm structures.  
 When individual THOFC are further scrutinized, a sharper image emerges regarding 
the specific role of each in industry networks. As García-Bernardo et al. (2017) corroborate, 
conduits such as Switzerland, The Netherlands, Singapore and Ireland are central to nearly 
every network, alongside sinks such as the Cayman Islands, BVI, and Bermuda. The THOFC 
core is indeed defined by structures such as the ‘Double Irish’ and ‘Dutch Sandwich’, as the 
literature suggests, defined within industries such as Materials, Diversified Financials, and 
Pharmaceuticals in which globalized production networks result in complex financial 
structures. Further, industry-specific THOFC are revealed, such as the Marshall Islands, 
Panama, and Cyprus in Transportation (shipping), and Jersey in Media. Certain geographical 
relationships also confirm the role of path dependence in shaping THOFC networks, evidenced 
by the Russia-Cyprus, India-Singapore-Mauritius, and China-Hong Kong-BVI-Cayman 
structures.  
 Our perspective, informed by theory from both EG and SM, helps shed light on the 
complex factors that determine the distribution of firm activity within THOFC, including both 
firm-level characteristics and the attributes of the jurisdictions themselves. There is also 
variation by industry and sector, including the level of technological sophistication, complexity 
of the production chain, and the degree of intellectual property. Further integration of the two 
fields should hone in on the role of regions and cities as financial command centers in global 
capitalism, as well as the role of producer service firms in shaping THOFC geographies 
(Goerzen et al., 2013); the coevolution of firms and locations (Mudambi et al., 2018); and, on 
understanding the redistributive impacts of globalization – which countries have gained most 
from the strategic decisions of firms. 
24 
 
Our concluding argument is that corporate network structures often mimic the 
geographies of taxation rather than actual distribution of production or consumption activities. 
Tax havens and offshore financial centers are in fact central to the global financial system, and 
will become increasingly important as corporate structures adapt to changing conditions and 
technologies faster than regulators can adapt. Network analysis reveals that the global 
economy’s most central THOFC are not ‘rogue states’—the vast majority of corporate 
structures involve either territorial nation-states or jurisdictions with strong rule of law and 
governance. As THOFC appear to harbor more corporations for which intellectual property 
law and data privacy come at the same premium as low taxes and banking secrecy, global 
regulation bring these jurisdictions under enhanced scrutiny. For this reason, new knowledge 
on the role they play in firm structures is critical, with a particular focus on how financial 
innovations and digitally-mediated capitalism have disrupted current regulatory and 
governance frameworks, and what impacts those may have on existing geo-economic 
structures.  
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 Headquarters Subsidiaries Headquarters Subsidiaries 
1 Cayman I (105) The Netherlands (9661) 11 Isle of Man (37) BVI (2033) 
2 Guernsey (102) Hong Kong (6751) 12 Switzerland (24) Mauritius (1293) 
3 Bermuda (98) Cayman I (5987) 13 Singapore (14) Cyprus (928) 
4 The Netherlands (92) Singapore (5791) 14 Cyprus (11) Marshall I (756) 
5 Belgium (83) Ireland (5086) 15 Gibraltar (6) Panama (602) 
6 Ireland (82) Luxembourg (4330) 16 Hong Kong (4) Barbados (397) 
7 Jersey (82) Switzerland (4031) 17 Panama (4) Malta (351) 
8 BVI (80) Bermuda (3539) 18 Antigua & Barbuda (2) Liberia (311) 
9 Marshall I (53) Malaysia (3459) 19 Malta (2) Costa Rica (297) 
10 Luxembourg (38) Belgium (2922) 20 Mauritius (2) Gibraltar (295) 
 
 Table 1. Top 20 Headquarters and Subsidiary Locations of THOFC 
 
 
 Out-strength (OS) In-strength (IS) Out-strength (OS) In-strength (IS) 
1 Switzerland (5159) The Netherlands (9872) 11 Cayman Islands (294) Mauritius (1288) 
2 The Netherlands (4537) Cayman I. (7168) 12 BVI (127) Marshall I.(947) 
3 Jersey (4029) Hong Kong (6582) 13 Cyprus (110) Cyprus (765) 
4 Ireland (3288) Singapore (5473) 14 Liberia (82) Panama (634) 
5 Bermuda (1787) Luxembourg (5212) 15 Hong Kong (77) Malta (339) 
6 Belgium (1322) Ireland (4611) 16 Neth. Antilles (48) Costa Rica (322) 
7 Luxembourg (1021) Switzerland (4441) 17 Guernsey (27) Liberia (321) 
8 Singapore (530) Bermuda (4124) 18 Gibraltar (17) Gibraltar (319) 
9 Marshall I. (503) Belgium (2937) 19 Panama (16) Barbados (306) 
10 Isle of Man (413) BVI (1604) 20 Malta (15) Bahamas (255) 
 
Table 2. Out-strength and In-strength of THOFC by Country 
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Figure 1: Retailing industry group backbone network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Utilities industry group backbone network 
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Figure 3: Technology industry group backbone network 
Figure 4: Pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and life sciences industry group backbone 
network 
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